Editor’s Note: Charles Dahan is one of the coaches of the reigning NFL National Champions in Public Forum Debate from Durham Academy, NC. His video interview on NFLtv.org on the December 2009 topic is the most popular video on the Web site. It can be accessed here: http://nfltv.org/2009/11/23/interview-december-pf-topic/

Compared to most other resolutions this season, the February PF topic is particularly nebulous. Much of this post will be attempting to define what, exactly, the resolution is asking. Of course, these opinions are my own and not those of the NFL, and my thoughts on the topic–while not advocating particular arguments–do attempt to carve an area for fruitful debate. As a general rule, I prefer debaters genuinely attempt to find the question at the heart of the resolution and seek to make persuasive arguments for their side, rather than seeking the limits of the topic and advocating taking stances that result in a lack of clash in rounds. With that in mind, I’ll break this post down into three areas: definitions, positions, and research.

Definitions

This resolution asks us to define two concepts: “organized political lobbying” and “harm versus good.” The former, on its face, is fairly straight forward. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires people who are paid to make contact with legislative and executive branch actors to register with the government. The ‘K Street’ lobbying firms are often comprised of former government officials and partisan power brokers who are hired by special interest groups to lobby for particular causes. Alternatively, special interest groups may be sufficiently well funded and organized (such as the NRA) to conduct such lobbying without the use of lobbying firms. The former are notable because they do not necessarily have an explicit policy mission (though they usually are comprised of individuals with similar ideological or party affiliations)–they merely leverage their influence and personal connections to do the bidding of any suitor willing to pay them. These K Street firms are what I wish to focus on, as their point of view is malleable and unclear. Specifically, firms such as the NRA gain their influence through leveraging their membership base, whereas the power and influence of organized political lobbyists is NOT derived from membership or even financial contributions, but instead due to personal connections with legislative and executive officials. This point is important as it defines the value of political lobbyists; while many may object to direct financial contributions to candidates, such influence is clear and measurable and limited by one’s wealth rather than one’s personal connections.

Of course, this does not include citizens who contact government officials without receiving financial compensation. There are even large, organized efforts by unpaid citizens. The notable difference between such grass-roots movements and organized political lobbying firms is the permanence of the latter; whether a firm on K Street or an organization like the NRA, the existence of firms is justified not by an immediate and temporary policy request but rather long-standing relationships with legislators and players within government—a relationship that assumes influence over the decisions those actors make.

Positions

By ‘position’ I mean your case’s thesis. To a large extent, think about what type of harm and good you’re addressing. Once you define the harms and goods, you can have a genuine debate about the extent of the harms and goods on either side of the resolution, and attempt to persuade the judge that the balance tips positively or negatively, depending on the side you’re debating. For example, on the affirmative you stake a position that organized political lobbying undermines the democratic process. What is implied by this simple statement? It implies that what you’re valuing is the democratic process, and the judge should weigh the round based upon whether or not organized political lobbying undermines this concept. Obviously, there are multiple concepts that are affected by political lobbying, and you must determine which of these concepts are most important to be discussed in the round. While you may not enter a round and state, “My thesis is x,” you should have given these concepts a good deal of thought so that you can know what, exactly, you are talking about and how each of your arguments and those arguments of your opponents relate to the round (and the metric your judge is using to determine the winner.)

In this resolution, my initial personal preference is that debaters determine why political lobbying occurs—what is it trying to influence, what inefficiency in the market for legislation is it trying to solve, and how and why does it actually work. This last thought experiment is important because it allows you to determine who advocates for political lobbying, and who is opposed to it, and the self interest of these actors in either the support or opposition. For example, the NRA may serve as a political lobbying group and, through pooling the resources and preferences of its members, effectively influence legislation in a manner that each individual would be unable to do on their own. Conversely, by definition a political lobbying firm is paid because its lobbyists produce certain outcomes that the company or organization which hires it cannot produce on its own—therefore perhaps implying an influence in the legislative process that is unequal to other actors.

Research

I advocate students begin research with broad searches on Google or Google Scholar, in order to define the terms and gain a grasp of what the resolution. Initial research should be conducted to gain a knowledge of the topic, and the arguments those who engage in this debate often use. This reading should not be done to find evidence or quotes, but instead to become informed about the issue you’ll be discussing.

One particularly famous article on political lobbying is, “A Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,” by Anthony Downs, found in the Journal of Political Economy (April 1957) An informative debate between scholars on the topic took place in the American Economic Review, between Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale in their article “Caps on Political Lobbying,” and a response from Todd Kaplan and David Wettstein eight years later. These, of course, are merely places to start and understand how this debate unfolds between scholars.

Downs, Anthony. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy. Vol 65.2. (April 1957)

Kaplan, Todd and David Wettstein. “Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment.” The American Economic Review. (September 2006)

Che, Yeon-Koo and Ian Gale. “Caps on Political Lobbying.” The American Economic Review. (June 1998)

This overview was written for RupeScholars.org and www.charlesdahan.com. Charles is a PhD student in American Politics as the University of North Carolina, and can be contacted at charlesd (at) me (dot) com.